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Grasping the Site/Sight /Cite of the 
Image: A Lacanian Explication 
jan jagodzinski 
Reading images psychoanalytically from a Lacanian perspective 
has its challenges. The first task of this essay is to provide a way through 
what is often taken to be difficult and impenetrable theory, to explicate 
how the homology site/ sight/ cite can be understood in any act of 
critical perception. Its second task is to make distinctions between a 
psychoanalytic understanding of the subject as being 'split' or divided 
(as represented by the matheme '$,' Lacan's symbol for this form of 
subjectivity) when applied to art, as opposed to a naive realist subject 
of representation or a savvy poststructuralist (decentered) subject of 
postmodernity. For this second task, the question of what constitutes 
an 'object' for a subject in psychoanalysis comes front and center when 
discussing visual culture. 
To begin then with the homology: the first site is identified with 
Lacan's psychic register of the Real (capitalized to distinguish it from 
the 'real' of naive reality-the idea that reality is solely what the senses 
reveal). The Real is the very opposite of 'reality' as such. The Real was 
Lacan's punning claim that there is a psychic level that eludes our ability 
to see or to say anything about it. The Real is always present, however 
its presence can only be felt retroactively and only be theorized 
negatively; that is to say, the unconscious Real reveals itself by what 
Freud referred to as acts of Verneinung (negation) in the symbolic 
register, as well as acts of Verleugnung (disavowal) in the Imaginary 
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register, while an act of Verwerfung (foreclosure, rejection) in the Real 
meant a fall into psychosis where the authority of the Law had been 
rejected. Language itself becomes objectified and disembodied. The 
subject finds no place in the social symbolic order. Verneinung is 
attributed to the level of speech acts where conscious negation hides 
its opposite, unconscious affirmation. Verleugnung concerns an act of 
conscious perception where the sight of something is denied (leugnen) 
and immediately redirected to a fetishized object to fill in the missing 
gap created by the perceptual disavowal. Lastly, the foreclosure of the 
Law, Verwerfung, means that something is "thrown away" (werfen), 
dismissed or refused. In Lacanian terms this is the refusal of The N ame-
of-the-Father in patriarchal societies like our own. Overseeing the 
general symbolic order are the acts of general repression (Verdriingung) 
as well as misunderstanding (Verdichtung), in addition to Verneinung 
(negation) as previously mentioned (see Lacan 1993, pp. 82-84). The 
point being that all of these acts are anti-hermeneutic in nature: they 
defy interpretation (sense-making) as well know it. 
It seems perhaps odd for visual cultural art educators to cope 
with a dimension that alludes both speech and sight, but this is precisely 
what is being claimed for a psychoanalytic understanding of the image 
and its critical interpretation. The Real refers to what is absent, outside 
the frame of perception and potentially abyssal in its comprehension, 
a variation of which is referred to as mise-en-abfme ",:hen potentially a 
story within a story is never-ending in its multiple enframings, such as 
the final scene in the sci-fi film Men in Black where the camera telescopes 
away from the earth reaching a point where two alien creatures are 
playing dice with the earth. Further telescoping from this scene is 
possible ad infinitum. It is possible, of course, to reverse this same 
telescopic frame within a frame in the opposite direction as in the films 
of Charles and Ray Eames such as the Powers of Ten (1977) and enter 
the bodies of the two MIB characters, from which the scene started, 
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into the recesses of quantum physics, never coming to a final resting 
place of 'matter.' Matter itself becomes ephemeral, but now has 'force,' 
or immanence as theorized by Gilles Deleuze throughout his long 
career. 
The Real is always with us in the act of looking, and it is site specific. 
Calling it site specific means that the Real always refers to a singularity, 
a singularity that enables a frame to emerge. If this sounds too mystical 
or confusing at this moment, I ask the reader to be patient as this essay 
unfolds. The Real, not being signified nor figured, can only show itself 
topologically in the singularity of a site (see Wajcman, 1999). It is where 
the subject for Lacan dwells: not the subject of seeing or speaking, of 
sight and speech-which he refers to as the ego or me (moi), nor is this 
a grammatical subject that language offers by way of numerous 
pronouns that can be occupied as we read; rather it is a subject of the 
unconscious-the singularity of "I" or Ie, as traced by memories, 
forgetfulness, associations and disassociations, traumas, loses, 
mourning, melancholia and so on-all the' other side' of one's known 
autobiography. All looking involves this unconscious subject. It comes 
into play despite ourselves. It is an excess that always betrays our self-
assured confidence that we say what we mean and mean what we say. 
The second sight seems simple enough. It refers to the Imaginary 
psychic register-to the figure, to the framing of phenomenological 
perception, and to Gestalt psychology. This, of course, is the place where 
visual cultural education hegemonically dweIIs through its numerous 
cognitive perceptual schemas and nets. Yet, this is precisely the register 
that Lacan identifies as the seat of fantasy and mis/re/cognition 
(meconnaissance). It is "mis" cognition in the sense that the imaginary 
refers to a mirror-self that is spectral, and a "re" cognition in the sense 
that we have no choice but to identify with this alter-ego spectral self 
(our imago) when we are in and of this world (as dasein). Paradoxically, 
it is also the psychic register where creative play can happen to break 
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the perceptual constants that frame us. As the seat of the conscious 
self, it is where the conflicts of vision are at play. However, as shall be 
shown, within this "idealogical" playground of signification lays the 
dark stain of the Real as objet a, framing the imaginary. 
Lastly, cite refers to the Symbolic order, the order of language and 
the signifier whose status can be iconic as a particular cultural code 
structures our ideologies that are either consonant with out Imaginary 
fantasies, or resistant to them. The cultural Law governs this Symbolic 
order, however, there is always a "state of exemption" which brings in 
the shadowy "obscene supplement," the clandestine activities that take 
place outside the Law knowingly sanctioned by those who claim to be 
upholding it.] 
With this preliminary exploration of the homology site/ cite/ sight 
in place, which knots Lacan's three psychic orders (Real, Imaginary, 
Symbolic) in complex ways, I turn to what makes psychoanalysis an 
important theory to help us think through the banality of the image in 
postmodernity. I use the descriptor banality purposefully here to indicate 
that in contemporary society the mediated image surrounds us 
everywhere. Virilio (1988) gets it right when he said, 
From now on everything passes through the image. The image 
has priority over the thing, the object, and sometimes even the 
physically-present being. Just as real time, instantaneous, had priority 
over space. Therefore the image is invasive and ubiquitous. Its role is 
not to be in the domain of art, the military domain or the technical 
domain, it is to be everywhere, to be reality ... I believe that there is a 
war of images ... And I can tell you my feelings in another way: winning 
today, whether it's a market or a fight is merely not losing sight of 
yourself (pp. 4-5). 
It is this ubiquity of images that makes them banal. Yet, the 
question emerges as to why certain images are then invested with a 
force that maKes them stand out for the viewer, and catch his or her 
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attention. Such a question can be answered by coming to an 
understanding of Lacan's notion of the object-more precisely- objet 
a in his lexicon whose singularity belong to the Real. It refers to the 
haunts of absence and the cause of desire-that which invests the banal 
image with a "magic" or force of its own. To explain this I start with a 
joke. 
A Joke: Lenin in Moscow 
Figure 1 
A Moscow art exhibit displayed a picture (figure 1) of Nadezhda 
Krupskaya, Lenin's wife in bed with a young member of the 
Komsomol- the Russian "Communist Union of Youth." Below the 
work was displayed its title "Lenin in Warsaw." A visitor, after closely 
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examining the image, and then reading the title became confused. 50 
he politely asked the guide, "but where is Lenin?" The guide, quietly 
and without a wink turned to the visitor and replied, "Lenin is in 
Warsaw." 
The visitor's mistake occurs because s/he presumes a 5ausserian 
semiology (1966), that is, a direct representational relationship between 
the image and its title--as if there was a direct relation between a sign 
and its referent. This has been the dominant assumption around for 
quite some time. Art educators have become a lot smarter since the 
time of this joke that has been around at least since 1918. More specifi-
cally, Visual Culture art educators have been clever enough to embrace 
a semiology that has taken a poststructuralist turn. The dominant field 
of visual research that has embraced these poststructuralist tenants 
maintains that there is no metalanguage, attempting to escape the 
naivete of "presence" (as implied in the joke) - that vision has a direct 
access to the referent, still embraced by many in the visual field through 
such claims as "art speaks for itself;" all we need to do is mystically 
"feel it" and so on. Or, yet others who embrace a phenomenological 
perspective main- taining that the "thing-in-
itself"- the refer- ent- can be "captured" 
through visual means alone, claiming a 
visual realm for themselves to demarcate a 
separate and distinct 
of text that haunt the 
of language. During 
formalism, the 
visual field from all forms 
image through the specter 
the heyday of modernist 
works of Mark Rothko 
(e.g., figure 2) have been notorious for promoting this direct access of 
meaning through the color field alone. This metaphysical tradition of 
modernism does not easily go away. 
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Let us get back to the poststructuralist position-brought on by 
the digital age-and address those visual art researchers who have 
embraced a cultural studies approach where hybrid forms of art, 
combining visual and textual forms together have become standard 
practice, such as the well-known works of Barbara Kruger (fig.3). 
Kruger's work turns the ad vertisement message in on itself. The play 
of the signifier had become so pervasive in advertising in the 80s, so 
much so, that the process of interpellation became the subject of her 
art, broadly drawing on the theoretical writing of Althusser (2001). 
Figure 3. Barbara Kruger 
In poststructuralism the position of metalanguage has been 
rejected and replaced with the ground zero of ordinary language and 
the banality of everyday images. Ordinary language and the banal 
image from this poststructuralist claim is its own metalanguage, which 
leads us into the quagmires of multiple interpretations -the game of 
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endless semiosis that hermeneuticians are fond of playing to extract 
multiple meanings to answer, for instance, in the above figure, "Why 
is the girl making this face when it comes to money and love?" We 
have here a self-referential textual language and visual imaginary based 
on difference that is savvy in its claim that the referent can never be 
known. We have a distancing from "reality" that is constructed and 
reconstructed, the endless slipping signifiers which de(sign)er 
capitalism requires to sell more products. As many critics pointed out, 
it did not take long to commodify Kruger's own output, establishing a 
"signature style" and selling her work at the art world boutique of 
Mary Boone Gallery, New York (Gleason 1999). In lieu of leftist activism, 
her radically chic style of sound-byte catch-phrases, meant to shock, 
came to a political dead end. The subject of her address can be read 
just as cynically as her savvy style itself. The object of her ridicule is 
not the media, the corporate sector nor patriarchy, but her contempt 
for the unreachable and unconcerned proletariat who seem to ignore 
the emancipation call by a moneyed leftist intelligentsia positioned in 
universities, colleges and in the culture industry. A disdain for the 
average working class person haunts her work, since her call to re-
educate the "masses" fails to do much more than affirm that those who 
have the power to selectively consume, find mass consumption a vulgar 
business. This, then, is the quagmire of multiple interpretations: it 
relativizes all interpretations as simply being ideological, avoiding the 
social consequences that each reading claims for its "truth" value. 
Visual art research, in its more critical poststructuralist 
manifestations, is engaged in sign wars (cultural wars), attempting to 
hijack the signifier back from designer capitalism, to decenter it, re-
signify its meaning and so on. Kruger exemplifies such a liberalist 
process. Most of this in done to disrupt discourses, to foster critical 
thinking and emancipation by a good-intentioned leftist intelligentsia 
caught by their own situational contradictions of privilege-what I have 
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called elsewhere a form of "romantic resistance" (jagodzinski, 2003) 
whose roots go back to Dadist tactics and the Situationists of the 50s 
and 60s where detournement and the psychogeography of derive were 
the critical strategies. The difference between the generations seems to 
be the failure of contemporary critical artists to exploit liminal spaces 
that cannot be so easily reterritorialized into commodity status-like 
Kruger, for instance. One thinks immediately of Critical Art Ensemble 
(CAE), a cell of artists who have practiced forms of cyberspace and 
performative resistance art that eventually led up to the persecution 
by the FBI of one of its leaders, Steve Kurtz on charges of bio-terrorism. 
This infinite self-referential and self-interpretive play of language 
in its visual translations - what often appear in Arts and Activities as 
school projects that quote art history, or that parody and pastiche the 
visual historical record and so on-to produce a self-reflexive, often 
ironic subject position, perhaps best exemplified by the long-standing 
television series The Simpsons, where self-referentiality abounds in 
laughter. It is a way of simply affirming that there is no escape from 
the capitalist designer imaginary. We live in an intermediated world of 
images that promotes a continuous cynical "winking" at its audience. 
All the monsters are beginning to lose their bite as the Disney machine 
turns them into animated cute and cuddly animals and robots. Tim 
Burton seems to be alone in trying to save the macabre. As "romantic 
resistance," I would maintain that no artist can out-sign the capitalist 
enterprise-unless, one, of course goes outside the law in such forms 
as graffiti and social action performances. But even here, the streets 
have become policed, and graffiti has in turn become more and more 
like decoration for spectators rather than the civil disobedience and 
transgression it once carried. What spaces are left then for artists to 
exploit, which refuse reterritorialization by capitalist commodification? 
Within the institutions of the art gallery, museum, and avant-garde art 
departments in universities that attempt to "teach" subversive 
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strategies, an impossibility according to James Elkins (2001), leaves us 
often with a practice of Cadillac Marxism, a post-marxism of romantic 
resistance best illustrated (perhaps) by the cartoon below. 
The poststructuralist ironic self-reflexive subject that is being 
shaped through such a curriculum of visual culture, but also including 
visual research, criticism, projects and so-forth-sometimes in the name 
of critical and emancipatory thought that does away with metalanguage 
and the naIve metaphysical presence of the image presents the case 
that there is no pure object-language and no pure visual imagery. No 
textual language and no visual imagery that would ever produce a 
purely transparent medium that captures "pure experience," and yet 
there is an insistence in the field of visual studies that "something" of 
this referent (that is the object) as unmediated reality comes through 
and affects us. So, on the one hand we have a naIve notion of 
representation that continues to mask itself as "reality," as in absurdity 
of "reality television", while on the other hand we have this savvy 
ironic self-reflexive subject who knows that it's a constructed 
representation through the use of elaborate rhetorical structuring 
devices, which either plays with it or tries to do it one better to expose 
this very constructedness. 
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I can, for instance, can construct an ironic subject position by 
making a viewer aware that that the first image (Lenin in Moscow) is 
simply a collage representation of the imaginary "real" painting of 
Lenin in Warsaw-if it ever existed in the first place (see figure 4). 
figure 4 
I would-however- maintain that neither one of these positions, 
which form the binary of de(sign)er capitalism, is able to come to terms 
with the way images might be read with a "rigor" that disrupts the 
naivete of the neoliberalist subject of presence and the so-called 
decentered multiple subject of poststructuralism. At this point, I could 
leave the reader hanging as to why the Lacanian subject is able to do 
just that-disrupt this binary. I present this puzzle in figure 5. 
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figure 5 
From a Lacanian standpoint, that "there is no metalanguage" and 
no meta-visual imagery has to be taken quite literally. All visual and 
textual language is an object-language; there can be no visual and 
textual language without an object- a referent always appears. Hence, 
even when it looks like the subject is caught-up in a web of self-
referential movement, in the recesses of inter-textualities, apparently 
only speaking about itself, not truly being able to say what he or she 
wants or means to say, or means what he or she wants to say, there is 
an objective non-signifying "reference" to this movement. 
Let us return to the joke, "Lenin in Warsaw" -to the absent third, 
Lenin- as the bearer of the prohibition of the sexual relationship. In 
the Lacanian psychoanalytic sense, this is the object of the picture. The 
title names the object that is lacking in the field of what is depicted, 
while the visitor remains caught by the trap of metalanguage. He 
establishes the same distance between the picture and the title as 
between the sign and its denotated object, as if the title speaks about 
the picture from a kind of objective distance, and then looks for its 
positive correspondence in the picture. A bit like the anecdote told of 
Picasso. 
Picasso once found himself discussing art with an American GI 
who professed to dislike abstract paintings because they were 
excessively unrealistic. The artist said nothing and the 
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conversation moved on to such other subjects as the Gl's girlfriend 
- a snapshot of whom he proudly showed Picasso. "My," Picasso 
exclaimed, examining the picture, "is she really that small?" 
Again the work of art does not have a direct correspondence to 
reality. 
So where is the object (as objet a) indicated by the title that is 
depicted? Like Magritte's famous "This is not a Pipe", (figure 6) the 
title and the picture is not connected by representation, but rather rest 
on the same surface, as part of the same continuity as the picture. "This 
is not a pipe" but a picture of the pipe is just one of the three possible 
readings of this work that Magritte mobilizes to problematize the 
referent which itself is about the impossibility of the referent. 2 
figure 6 
The title and the picture in the joke's case occupy the same plane 
as well, with the title embodying what is missing from the picture inside 
the same signifying plane as the picture itself occupies. Its distance 
from the picture is strictly internal. It is therefore not present to the 
Imaginary nor to symbolic language. It makes an incision or carves 
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into the picture such that something must fall (out) from the picture--
not its title, but the object that is replaced by the title. Lenin's absence 
is the void around which the picture frames itself-Lacan's objet a. The 
picture becomes the materialization of Lenin's absence, which is what 
"frames" the viewer's vision (figure 7). Hopefully, this now explains 
the riddle of figure 5. 
figure 7 
Objet a is the missing piece that structures vision-as represented 
by the black rectangle whose abyss lies in the viewer. This is where the 
viewer connects to the image, the abyss of the joke. In this case its very 
absence is what makes the picture possible--to exist at all. If Lenin 
were around, Krupskaya may not have dared the sexual encounter 
with her young lover. The image, indeed, could be used as blackmail 
since it now refers to the obscene supplement as established by the 
patriarchal laws of marriage. 
Objet a: The Cause of Desire 
The title of the picture functions as the Freudian 
Vorstellungsreprasentanz-the representative that is the substitute of 
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some other representation-a doubled representation. The German 
word is composed of two types of representations (Vorstellung and 
Reprasentanz). The title (as Vorstellung) is the signifying element filling 
out the vacant place of the missing representation (Reprasentanz)-
which is the depiction of Lenin himself (Lenin in Warsaw). The 
Imaginary visual is juxtaposed with a missing object that is recalled by 
the title. Here we have three psychic registers working-the framed 
Picture itself as the Imaginary, the Symbolic as the linguistic signifiers 
of the paradoxical title, and then the Real as the absent place of Lenin 
in Warsaw-the three site/ sight/ cites. 
The field of representation [in German Vorstellung] is the field of 
what can be represented. The problem is that not everything can be 
depicted (represented). Something has to fall out. The claim that "Lenin 
must be in Warsaw" and the title take the place of this missing void, of 
the "originally repressed" representation (Reprasentanz). Its very 
exclusion functions as a positive condition for the emergence of what 
is being depicted. If Lenin were not in Warsaw, Nadezhda Krupskaya 
could not be with the young Komsomol member (see image, below)). 
The content of the picture (as subject-like when we ask what is the 
subject of the picture), in this case Nadezhda Krupskaya with a young 
Komsomol member has (again) an object (a)-namely, Lenin in Warsaw. 
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For Lacan, any signifier has the status of a Vorstellungsreprasentanz 
-subject to this double representation. No longer a simple Saussurean 
material representative of the signified, it acts as a substitute filling out 
a void of some originally missing representation. It does not bring to 
mind yet more representation rather it brings out the lack of it -Le. 
Lenin in Warsaw. It 'fills' up, or puts a stop to what is referred to as a 
'hole' in the Other (Other here refers to the Symbolic order-the field 
of representational signifiers) so that its appears w(hole). The 
Vorstellungsreprasentanz is the pure, reflexive signifier incarnating the 
lack itself, which then fills out the void of this lost object, like the joke. 
Magritte was a master at presenting us with titles that recalled the absent 
object in his images. But as soon as the Vorstellungsrepriisentanz fails to 
be connected to this hole or lack in the Other [the field of representation], 
to the falling out of the object, it then simply functions as a 'title.' When 
this happens a title merely limits possibilities of interpretation, the 
metalinguistic process of becoming entangled in the hermeneutics of 
figuring out just what the picture "means." Such analysis can lead to 
the play of relativism (as multiple interpretations), but the more difficult 
work would be to try to figure out what makes the fantasy frame appear 
in the first place. 
It is the fantasy of the enframed work of art that provides us with 
the half-truth of those who maintain that the work stands alone, that it 
requires no analysis, and so on. But this fantasy structured by the frame 
is precisely where the lure of the object as object cause (a) of this fantasy 
resides. It is this unknowable object that holds the various imaginary 
discourses together to create the reality of the Symbolic order with its 
hegemonic fantasmal imaginings. Rigor is required to comes to terms 
with the non-sense signifier that holds the frame together; only in this 
way can the fantasy be exposed for what it is, what sustains it-why 
Lenin must be away for Krupskaya to have her fun. 
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Rigor, from a Lacanian psychoanalytic initiative, becomes a search 
to deduce what might be the objet a that frames vision. What structures 
your, a nation's, or an audience's imaginary fantasy of the world, the 
symbolic reality that is sustained ideologically by the object a? As it is 
the seat of ideology, the task then becomes to interrogate and question 
this objet a, this cause of desire-to see whether the fantasy should be 
ruined, exposed, discarded and transformed because of the 
consequences of its ethical and political implications. 
In the joke our complicit laughter simply affirms the truth of this 
objet a, that sustains a fantasy of illicit transgression (obscene 
supplement) by Krupskaya-exposed and made obvious in this case 
by the signifiers of the title. Perhaps Lenin himself would not have 
laughed, but then again, he's in Moscow! 
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Notes 
1 Most recently the philosophical output of Giorgio Agamben 
(2005) has developed this state of exemption within the sovereign Law. 
2 A second reading reverses the first reading that an image is not 
represented by its text by focusing on the demonstrative pronoun "this, 
" which can only refer referentially to the sentence. Hence, "This" 
(particular discursive statement) is not the image of a pipe. Lastly, a 
third reading emerges by doubling the demonstrative pronoun. "This" 
(referring to the entire image of a pipe as not represented by the 
discursive signifiers) is not a calli gram where image and word come 
together (like a poem about smoking in the form of a pipe). See Foucault, 
1983 
